Combatting Hate Speech at the Local Level: A Comparison of East Asian and European Approaches by Wolman, A.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Wolman, A. (2019). Combatting Hate Speech at the Local Level: A Comparison 
of East Asian and European Approaches. Nordic Journal of Human Rights / Nordisk 
Tidsskrift for Menneskerettigheter, 37(2), pp. 87-104. doi: 10.1080/18918131.2019.1614255 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/22097/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/18918131.2019.1614255
Copyright: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, 
University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral 
Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from 
City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to.
Reuse: Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, 
educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or 
charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are 
credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page 
and the content is not changed in any way. 





Combatting Hate Speech at the Local Level: A Comparison of 
East Asian and European Approaches 
 
By Andrew Wolman 
 
Abstract: Although existing research on hate speech law and policy has focused on the national 
level, there have been relatively few studies of local government approaches to the issue. This 
paper takes a step toward filling this gap by comparing hate speech policies in three European 
cities (Graz, Barcelona and London) with those developed in four East Asian cities (Osaka, 
Kawasaki, Seoul and Bucheon). These cities were chosen for study because in each case local 
governments have explicitly engaged with the issue of anti-hate speech policy. For each city, I 
focus on the type of anti-hate speech policy that has been developed, the motivations behind it, 
the challenges and opposition faced, and where relevant the diffusion of local anti-hate speech 
policy to and from other jurisdictions. This research is the product of a review of primary 
documents and media commentary, supplemented in one case by an e-mail interview. I then 
analyse the common elements and notable differences between local anti-hate speech policies in 
the two regions and conclude with observations on the different forms that local anti-hate speech 
policy has taken and suggestions for further research. 
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To date, comparative hate speech research has (with a few exceptions) most frequently 
focused on national or supranational-level regulation, often highlighting the perceived contrast 
between countries that choose to criminalise hate speech and countries that choose not to, often 
out of a desire to adhere to a broader conception of freedom of expression.1 This emphasis on 
national-level governance is understandable, and reflects a broader tendency for scholars to focus 
on ‘higher’ levels of governance (such as national and international institutions), where policy 
documents are more readily available and subject to wider debate. 2  However, this strand of 
research sometimes ignores considerable local-level differentiation, as well as the importance of 
local governments to the level of human rights and freedom enjoyed by citizens on the ground.3 
                                                          
1 See eg, Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis’ (2002-
03) 24 Cardozo L Rev 1523; Claudia Haupt, ‘Regulating Hate Speech – Damned if you do and Damned if 
you don’t: Lessons Learned from Comparing the German and U.S. Approaches’ (2005) 23 Boston Univ 
Intl l J 299; Roger Kiska, ‘Hate Speech: A Comparison between the European Court of Human Rights and 
the United States Supreme Court Jurisprudence’ (2012-13) 25 Regents Univ L Rev 107; Dominick 
McGoldric and Thérèse O’Donnell, Hate Speech Laws: Consistency with National and International 
Human Rights Law (1998) 18 Legal Studies 453. 
2 See Noha Shawki, ‘Global Norms, Local Implementation-How are Global Norms Translated into Local 
Practice?’ (2011) Globality Stud J <https://globality.cc.stonybrook.edu/?p=221> accessed 9 December 
2018; International Council on Human Rights Policy, Local Rule: Decentralisation and Human Rights 
(2002) 42. 
3 Conrad Mugoya Bosire, ‘Local Governments and Human Rights: Building Institutional Links for the 
Effective Protection and Realisation of Human Rights in Africa’ (2011) 11 Afr Hum Rts L J 147, 149 (‘local 




This article takes a different approach, by comparing hate speech policy at the local level 
in Europe and East Asia. The term ‘hate speech’ as used here refers to ‘incitement and 
encouragement of hatred, discrimination or hostility towards an individual that is motivated by 
prejudice against that person because of a particular characteristic.’4 It should be noted, however, 
that this definition is highly contested, and in fact some academics question whether a widely 
accepted definition of hate speech is even possible.5  The term ‘policy’ is broadly defined as ‘a 
course of action (or non-action) taken by a government or legislature with regard to a particular 
issue’.6 At the local level, policies can be implemented through legislative processes, leading to 
the passage of ordinances.7  However, hate speech policies can also be implemented through 
various types of local executive or agency actions, or through the work of independent 
commissions.  
This paper commences with a discussion of the potential reasons why local governments 
might want to develop a hate speech policy. This section engages with the recent research output 
on the localisation of human rights law, and decentralised governance. This is followed by two 
                                                          
4 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Hate Speech and Hate Crimes Against LGBT Persons 
1 (2009) <htttp://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Factsheet-homophobia-hate-speechcrime_EN.pdf> 
accessed 17 April 2018. This definition includes not just verbal expressions, but also hateful content 
transmitted online or in printed form. Maxime Lepoutre, ‘Hate Speecn in Public Discourse: A Pessimistic 
Defense of Counterspeech’ (2017) 43(4) Social Theory & Practice 851, 853. 
5 See, ‘Interview with Robert Post’ in Michael Herz & Peter Molnar (eds), The Content and Context of Hate 
Speech (CUP 2012) 31. In principle, hate speech definitions can be based on a number of different criteria, 
ranging from type or amount of harm caused to intrinsic properties of the speech such as the kinds of words 
used or ideas conveyed. Ibid. 
6 Christoph Knill & Jale Tosun, Public Policy: A New Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 4. 
7 See, generally Terence Daintith, ‘Law as Policy Instrument: A Comparative Perspective’  in Terence 
Daintith (ed), Law as an Instrument of Economic Policy: Comparative and Critical Approaches (de Gruyter 
1988) While the legal framework and language for local law-making differs from country to country, a 
municipal ordinance can broadly be defined as a ‘rule, law or regulation that is enacted in a town or city’. 
Black's Law Dictionary (2nd Edition) <http://thelawdictionary.org/municipal-ordinance/>  accessed 17 
April, 2019.  
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sections examining cases of local hate speech policies in Europe and East Asia. In Europe, the 
cases studied focus on Graz, Barcelona and London, while in East Asia, policies from Osaka, 
Kawasaki, Seoul and Bucheon are examined. For each city, I focus on the type of anti-hate speech 
policy that was developed, the motivations behind it, the challenges and opposition faced, and 
where relevant the diffusion of local anti-hate speech policy to and from other jurisdictions. These 
case studies have been conducted through reviewing primary sources, media commentary, and in 
the case of Bucheon an e-mail interview to supplement publicly available material. The seven 
cities have been chosen for analysis because they are in each case cities that have particularly 
prominently engaged in local hate speech policy-making. In the Korean context, hate speech has 
yet to become a major policy concern at the local level; Seoul and Bucheon have been chosen 
therefore less because hate speech has been prominently addressed by these two localities, but 
rather because they are the only two municipalities to even consider the issue. In the case of 
Bucheon, the city council’s consideration of a hate speech ordinance has not yet resulted in the 
act’s passage, so the case study focuses more on the experience of civil society advocacy rather 
than actual policy implementation. To a certain extent, all the cities chosen for study are therefore 
somewhat exceptional: it is probably fair to say that most municipalities in both Europe and Asia 
have yet to undertake significant policy-making in the area of hate speech.  
Finally, the article concludes with a discussion section that compares and contrasts hate 
speech policies in each region and discusses the possible reasons for patterns and policy 
divergences, followed by a brief conclusion. The paper is intended to provide a starting point for 
future research on local hate speech policy-making, along with a comparative analysis that can 




II. Hate Speech Policy at the Local Level 
 A cursory examination of the political science literature around decentralisation and 
subsidiarity would show that there are good reasons why municipal governments might want to 
develop hate speech policies. At the most general level, one argument in favour of local hate speech 
policy-making (and of subsidiarity as a general principle of public policy) is that it allows different 
communities within a heterogeneous nation to implement those policies that are most appropriate 
to a particular community’s policy preferences. Thus, communities with a strong human rights 
commitment are able to go beyond what their national governments feel comfortable embracing. 
For example, relatively progressive US cities such as San Francisco and Berkeley have enacted 
local policies to implement the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (‘CEDAW’), despite the US not being a party to the treaty.8 In the hate speech 
context, this means that the development of local hate speech policies would be more likely to 
ensure the desired level of policy implementation in cases where national-level policies are deemed 
to be inadequate. Barcelona may be an apt example of this with regards to hate speech, given its 
generally left-leaning political stance and status as one of Europe’s earliest ‘Human Rights 
Cities’.9 
                                                          
8 Risa Kaufman, ‘State and Local Commissions as Sites for Domestic Human Rights Implementation’, in 
Shareen Hertel and Kathryn Libal (eds), Human Rights in the United States: Beyond Exceptionalism (CUP 
2011) 101. Communities may also, of course, attempt to develop local policies that are antithetical to human 
rights norms, and in fact there have been a number of attempts to pass local anti-immigrant ordinances in 
the US in recent years. Many of these have been successfully challenged, however, for violating federal 
law. See, generally, ACLU, Local Anti-Immigrant Ordinance Cases, <https://www.aclu.org/other/local-
anti-immigrant-ordinance-cases> accessed 17 April 2018. 
9 Charlotte Berends et al (eds), Human Rights Cities: Motivations, Mechanisms, Implications (University 
College Roosevelt 2013) 35. 
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 In addition to jurisdictional variation in policy preferences, there may also be jurisdictional 
variations in the level of perceived need for hate speech policy-making. For example, those 
communities with particularly significant minority populations who are targets of hate speech may 
feel that hate speech suppression is a greater priority than other jurisdictions in the same country 
that are more homogeneous.  As discussed further below, Osaka and Kawasaki are good examples 
of this in the Japanese context, as they are known for being both a hotbed of nationalist protests 
and the hometown of many members of minority groups (and in particular ethnic Koreans). 
London may present a similarly strong need to control hate speech given its level of diversity. 
 Third, even where relevant local and national conditions or preferences do not diverge, 
local governments may still want to develop their own hate speech policies as a way to supplement 
those available at the national level, if actors at the national level are viewed as unable to 
effectively tackle the problem due to distance, resource constraints or other factors. According to 
Martin Landau, ‘redundancy serves many vital functions ... it provides safety factors, permits 
flexible responses to anomalous situations and provides a creative potential’.10 In the human rights 
context, there is evidence that the existence of redundant state and national anti-discrimination 
laws, each with their own complaint systems, boosts the total number of complaints, when 
compared to the situation where only one complaint mechanism is present.11 This emphasis on 
local policies as a supplement to those at the national level can perhaps also be seen in London, 
where there is relatively little policy divergence between local and national authorities.  
                                                          
10 Martin Landau, ‘Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap’ (1969) 29(4) 
Public Administration Review 346, 356. 
11 Andrew Wolman, ‘National Human Rights Institutions and their Sub-National Counterparts’ (2017) 6 
International Human Rights Law Review 1, 21. 
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 A final factor that could lead to the development of local hate speech policies may be a 
desire by local jurisdictions to ‘brand’ themselves as particularly welcoming localities, as a way 
to stand out from their peers and perhaps attract new inhabitants, businesses and tourists.12 There 
is some evidence that this branding motivation has played a role in the establishment of ‘human 
rights cities’ over the past two decades.13 
 Despite these factors that might mitigate in favour of the development of local level hate 
speech policies, such policies have historically been relatively rare around the world. The United 
States was a partial exception in this regard, as several cities passed ordinances restricting various 
forms of hate speech in the first half of the twentieth century.14 In the wake of the 1992 US 
Supreme Court case of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,15 however, which declared a municipal anti-
cross-burning ordinance to be unconstitutional on free speech grounds, municipal governments 
have faced strong legal restrictions on their ability to prohibit hate speech.16 
 Over the last few years, however, local governments seem to be taking a greater interest in 
the issue. In the United States, the renewed interest in local hate speech policy (outside the realm 
of still-prohibited restrictive ordinances) is perhaps a reaction to the degradation of public 
                                                          
12 See, eg, Barbara Oomen, ‘Rights and the City: Does the Localization of Human Rights Contribute to 
Equality?’ in Marjolein van den Brink et al (eds), Equality and human rights: nothing but trouble?, Liber 
amicorum Titia Loenen, SIM Special no 38, SIM (2015) 404. 
13 With respect to Nantes, see Berends et al (n 7) 85-102. 
14 Joseph Tanenhaus, ‘Group Libel’ (1950) 35(2) Cornell Law Review 261, 284-85 (citing ordinances from 
Denver, Sacramento, Cincinnati, Omaha and Chicago prohibiting forms of hate speech, along with 
ordinances from Portland  (Oregon) and Houston that mandate the denial of permits for particular forms of 
hate speech). At the time these were known as ‘group libel’ laws. See Note, ‘A Communitarian Defense of 
Group Libel Laws’ (1988) 101 Harvard Law Review 682, 684 (‘Group libel laws are statutes or ordinances 
that criminally punish racially or religiously bigoted expression.’)  
15 505 US 377 (1992) (USA). 
16  Nathan Courtney, ‘British and United States Hate Speech Legislation: A Comparison’ (!993) 19 
Brooklyn J Intl L 727, 758 
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discourse that has accompanied the rise of Trump and the alt-right.17 Thus, over the past two years, 
Fargo, North Dakota has created a hate speech task force, Orange County has launched a public 
campaign for a hate-free environment and Claremont, California has inaugurated a human rights 
commission with an objective of addressing intolerance and hate crimes.18 As discussed below, 
this increased interest in local hate speech policies has also been evident in Europe and East Asia. 
The remainder of this paper examines seven cities that have developed particularly notable hate 
speech policies: three in Europe (Graz, Barcelona and London), and four in Asia (Osaka, Kawasaki, 
Seoul and Bucheon). 
III. Local Hate Speech Policies in Europe 
 While municipalities in the United States may be handicapped in their ability to pass 
restrictive hate speech ordinances due to the US Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of freedom 
of expression, European cities would not generally face similar barriers. In most (if not all) 
European countries, it is constitutionally permissible to regulate hate speech, and there are already 
a number of provisions banning hate speech, either in narrow circumstances, such as with 
Holocaust denial laws,19 or more broadly with respect to offensive or denigrating speech based on 
characteristics such as race, religion or national origin.20  On the other hand, the presence of 
national hate speech laws would in some cases reduce the incentive for cities to act themselves in 
the arena. Thus, where European cities have chosen to engage in hate speech policy-making, there 
                                                          
17 JoAnn Kamuf Ward, ‘Challenging a Climate of Hate and Fostering Inclusion: The Role of U.S. State and 
Local Human Rights Commissions’ (2017) 49 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 29.  
18 Ibid 
19 McGoldrick & O’Donnell, n 1 (456).  
20 Alexander Tsesis, ‘Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a Democracy’ (2009) 44 Wake 
Forest Law Review 497, 521. 
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has been a tendency to focus more on combatting a particular aspect of the problem. In this section, 
I examine three specific cases, in Graz, Barcelona, and London. 
1. Graz 
 Graz, whose population of 325,000 makes it the second largest city in Austria, was one of 
the first European cities to develop its own policies to address hate speech. Due to its proximity to 
Austria’s southern border, it includes significant minority populations from the former Yugoslavia. 
While its current mayor is from the conservative Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP), Graz City 
Council is also notable for its large contingent from the communist Kommunistische Partei 
Österreichs (KPÖ) party. Graz declared itself a ‘Human Rights City’ in 2001, upon the City 
Council’s adoption of the Graz Declaration of Human Rights.21 In the following years, the city 
built up an administrative structure to protect human rights based around its anti-discrimination 
office and Human Rights Council.22 Throughout this process, the City closely partnered with the 
university-based European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in 
Graz (ETC Graz) in its human rights work, which included conducting anti-hate speech 
workshops.23 The City also issued a number of declarations and documents condemning hate 
speech, such as its accession document to the European Coalition of Cities Against Racism in 2006, 
which condemned the use of hate speech in political discourse, along with its Declaration on the 
use of racist, anti-Semitic and xenophobic elements in political discourse.24 It has also recently 
                                                          
21 Klaus Starl, ‘Human Rights City Graz: Lessons Learnt from the First 15 Years’ in Martha Davis et al, 
eds, Human Rights Cities and Regions: Swedish and International Perspectives (Raoul Wallenberg Inst 
2017) 51. 
22 Berends et al (n 10) 57. 
23  ETC Graz, Anleitung zum GEGENREDEN: How to Argue against Hate Speech, <http://www.etc-
graz.at/typo3/index.php?id=955> accessed 8 December 2018. 
24 Starl (n 22) 53. 
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engaged in promotional work such as the production of short anti-hate speech films by the youth 
platform of the City’s Human Rights Advisory Board.25 
 The most prominent area of anti-hate speech policy in Graz has, however, centred on 
combatting hate speech in the political arena. Starting with the 2006-07 election cycle, the City 
also requested the Graz Municipal Human Rights Council (MHRC) to initiate a program of 
monitoring election campaigns in order to report upon and publicly oppose hate speech and 
discriminatory statements issued in the context of political campaigns.26 These reports were then 
published once every fortnight during a period of six to eight weeks prior to an election. As the 
reports were the product of a non-judicial independent council, they were required to be politically 
neutral, and to avoid conclusions as to whether or not a candidate may have breached legal 
prohibitions on hate speech. 27  This reporting process has continued through the 2017 local 
elections, the final report for which identified 122 human rights relevant discourse strands, six of 
which were deemed problematic and one of which did not conform to human rights standards.28 
 After the first round of election reporting in 2006-07, the Graz City Council decided to 
enact a sanctioning mechanism for political parties who were deemed to have engaged in political 
hate speech. Under this mechanism, the findings of the monitoring report are negotiated before an 
independent arbitration committee chaired by the president of the appellate court, which then has 
                                                          
25 ETC Graz, Annual Report 2017 (2018) 12. 
26 Starl (n 22) 54 
27 Ibid 
28 ETC Graz (n 26) 14. 
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the power to recommend that the City Council reduce subsidies (of up to €30,000) for the culpable 
political parties.29  
Although the Graz policy does not directly enforce or expand the pre-existing criminal law 
against hate speech in Austria,30 it has in one case assisted law enforcement officers in obtaining 
a conviction through the compilation of a candidate’s statements, which were then used as 
evidence by the criminal tribunal.31 This was the first example in Austria of a politician being 
convicted for hate speech used in the context of a political campaign.32 While there has reportedly 
been opposition to the monitoring of political hate speech on freedom of expression grounds, this 
has not led to any protests so far.33 The city’s experiences with hate speech policy-making have 
been disseminated in recent years with the support of regional actors, for example through the 
publication of a toolkit for addressing hate speech at the municipal level.34  
2. Barcelona 
With a very diverse population of about 1.6 million inhabitants, Barcelona is the second 
largest city in Spain, and the capital city of the Autonomous Community of Catalunya.35 It is 
governed by a City Council, composed of a mayor, governing council and plenary assembly.36 
                                                          
29 Ibid 
30 Austria has a number of national laws that directly or indirectly criminalise hate speech, most notably 
through article 283 of the criminal code and article 3 of the 1947 National Socialism Prohibition Act. 
31 Appellate Court (OLG) Graz, judgment of June 30, 2009 (11 Bs 146/09t) (Austria).   
32 Starl (n 22) 55. 
33 Berends et al (n 10) 72. 
34  ETC Graz et al, ‘Combatting Racism and Hate Speech: Buildnig a Non-Racist Society’, 
<http://www.eccar.info/sites/default/files/document/11_Toolkit-en_HateSpeech.pdf> accessed 8 
December 2018. 
35 Ibid, 37. 
36 Ibid, 38.  
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Politically, Barcelona has long favoured left leaning leaders; its current mayor Ada Colau is a 
former housing activist who has been called the world’s most radical mayor. 37 As is the case in 
Graz, the Barcelona city government has a relatively long history of involvement in human rights 
issues. It participated in the drafting of the European Charter for the Safeguarding of Human Rights 
in the City, and was one of the first municipalities to proclaim itself a ‘human rights city’.38 Since 
1998, City has possessed an Anti-Discrimination Office, and more recently it has also established 
a Human Rights Ombudsman and a Human Rights Observatory, each of which now functions 
independently of the City government.39 
Starting in 2010, Barcelona has become more involved in addressing hate speech issues. 
While Graz has focused on hate speech in the political sphere, the Barcelona authorities have 
directed their energies at combatting hate speech online and in social media. In 2010, the City 
Council set up the anti-rumour citizen network to design and implement ‘a citywide strategy 
against negative unfounded rumours which make living together in diversity difficult, based both 
on networking with different social agents and organisations, and on promoting the role of an 
active anti-rumour agent.’40 To date, over 900 ‘anti-rumour agents’ have been trained to combat 
unfounded rumours in their communities, and there have also been anti-rumour video and cartoon 
campaigns.41        
                                                          
37  Dan Hancox, ‘Is This the World’s Most Radical Mayor?’ The Guardian (26 May 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/26/ada-colau-barcelona-most-radical-mayor-in-the-
world> accessed 8 December 2018. 
38 Berends et al (n 10) 35. 
39 Ibid, 44-5. 
40 Francesco Tarantino, ‘The BCN Anti-Rumour Strategy and the BCN Anti-Rumour Network’ (2014) EU-
MIA Research Report 11. 
41 Daniel De Torres et al, ‘Cities Free of Rumours’ (Council of Europe 2015) 30. 
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While it would be difficult to measure its efficacy, the anti-rumour network presents an 
innovative example of an attempt to combat hate speech not by punishing it, but rather by refuting 
it, arguing against it, and attempting to prevent hateful or slanderous rumours from being accepted 
as fact. This can be considered a form of ‘counterspeech’, which is sometimes advocated as the 
optimal way to combat hate speech, especially in jurisdictions such as the United States that have 
constitutional barriers to repressive laws.42 Several other cities in Spain and elsewhere in Europe 
have adopted their own versions of anti-rumour networks, inspired by the Barcelona template, 
which has been publicised internationally by both the Council of Europe and United Cities and 
Local Governments (UCLG), a transnational organisation of sub-national governments.43  
More recently, the Barcelona authorities have directed their energies at combatting hate 
speech online and in social media. In the wake of the 2017 Barcelona terrorist attack, the anti-
rumours network was particularly active in addressing online hate speech, using infograms to 
encourage critical thinking about messages that include content that is insulting, manipulative or 
based on rumours or prejudices.44 The city has also prepared a protocol for how to respond to hate 
                                                          
42 See, generally, Robert Richards & Clay Calvert, ‘Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at the Old Remedy 
for “Bad” Speech’ (2000) BYU Law Review 553. By relying on community agents, the anti-rumours 
network avoids placing the burden for engaging in counterspeech directly on the victims of hate speech, 
which is one of the common criticisms of counterspeech as an anti-hate strategy. Katharine Gelber, 
‘Reconceptualizing Counterspeech in Hate Speech Policy (with a Focus on Austalia’ in Michael Herz & 
Peter Molnar (eds), The Content and Context of Hate Speech (CUP 2012) 206. 
43  Ibid; UCLG, ‘Barcelona – Anti-Rumours Network <https://www.uclg-cisdp.org/en/news/latest-
news/barcelona-anti-rumours-network> accessed 8 December 2018.  
44 Ajuntament de Barcelona, ‘Sharing Efforts to Wipe Out Rumours and Hate Speech on Social Media’ (18 
September 2017) http://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/dretsidiversitat/en/noticia/sharing-efforts-to-wipe-out-
rumours-and-hate-speech-on-social-media> accessed 8 December 2018. 
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speech on social networks, and encouraging people to report hate speech to the authorities in cases 
where it could violate the criminal law.45  
In 2017, the Barcelona City Council organised a conference on online hate speech.46 This 
provided an avenue for furthering policy development through interactions between bureaucrats, 
advocates and academics. The municipal government further justified holding the conference by 
claiming that ‘the fact that cities constitute key places for citizen action and social innovation 
makes them ideal spaces for combatting the prejudices that underlie online hate speech’.47 The 
main practical outcome of the conference was the establishment of the #Bcnvodi hashtag and 
online platform to disseminate the City’s anti-hate speech policies. 48  In addition to various 
informational and promotional material, the site provides practical advice for victims and links to 
resources to denounce online hate speech and receive legal assistance. 
3. London 
With one of the most diverse urban populations in the world, London has long been 
concerned with preserving inter-group comity.49 In comparison with other major cities, however, 
local governance is relatively weak, with power divided up between a high profile mayor (who 
                                                          
45 Ibid.  
46 According to Mayor Colau, the conference was intended to “empower citizens so that they are educated, 
alert, active and vigilant, and that they mobilise to combat hate speech”. Ajuntament de Barcelona, ‘In the 
Face of Hate Speech, Critical and Digitally Empowered Citizens’ (2 March 2017) 
<https://www.barcelona.cat/infobarcelona/en/in-the-face-of-hate-speech-critical-and-digitally-
empowered-citizens_475567.html> accessed 8 December 2018. 
47  Ajuntament de Barcelona, Bcnvodi Conference Programme, 
<http://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/bcnvsodi/en/conference/programme> accessed 8 December 2018. 
48 See Ajuntament de Barcelona, #Bcnvodi at <http://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/bcnvsodi/es> accessed 8 
December 2018. 
49 Mike Raco et al, Dealing with Urban Diversity: The Case of London (Utrecht Univ 2017) 9. 
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nevertheless lacks significant authority in most sectors), 32 borough governments, the Corporation 
of London (the sub-metropolitan authority in charge of the financial district called the City), the 
Greater London Authority, and the London Assembly.50 Most policies affecting Londoners are 
still developed and implemented at the national level. 
Among the metropolitan authorities, the Mayor’s office has in recent years spoken out on 
hate speech issues most prominently. This is perhaps unsurprising given the background of current 
mayor Sadiq Khan as a human rights lawyer, as well as the significant amount of hate speech that 
he has faced as the first Muslim mayor of a major western capital city. Mayor Khan has also been 
faced with spikes of hate crimes during his tenure, in response to terrorist attacks and xenophobic 
sentiment stemming from the Brexit debate.51 
Mayor Khan has focused on two issues in particular. The first is online hate speech. He has 
publicly advocated for large fines to be applied to tech platforms that failed to remove hate 
messages.52 More concretely, the Mayor’s office set up the Online Hate Crime Hub in 2017 to 
work with victims to remove hate speech from the internet and prosecute those responsible.53 As 
                                                          
50 Ibid; Ben Worth & Mark Bennister, ‘Rebels as Local Leaders? The Mayoralties of Boris Johnson and 
Ken Livingstone Compared’ 3 
<https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2017/Rebels%20as%20Local%20Leaders%2
0Ken%20and%20Boris%20v3.pdf> accessed 8 December 2018. 
51 Sophia Sleigh, ‘Sadiq Khan Launches Crackdown on Brexit Vote Hate Crime’ Evening Standard (8 July 
2016) <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/mayor/sadiq-khan-launches-crackdown-on-brexit-vote-hate-
crime-a3291331.html> accessed 8 December 2018. 
52  Dave Lee, ‘London Mayor Warns Big Tech on Hate Speech’ BBC (12 March 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-43367211> accessed 8 December 2018. 
53  The Hub consists of ‘specially trained officers who work with community groups. social media 
organisations, academic hate crime specialists and criminal justice partners to investigate online hate crimes, 
including abuse on Twitter and Facebook, and provide support for victims’. Mayor of London, ‘Online 
Hate Crime Summit 2017’ <https://www.london.gov.uk/mopac/online-hate-crime-summit-2017> accessed 
8 December 2018. 
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of 27 July 2018, the programme had investigated 711 cases of online hate speech (63% of which 
involved racism), which led to five successful prosecutions, while 340 victims were referred for 
specialist support.54 In many other cases, the abusive language was successfully removed from the 
internet.55 Officers in the hate crime hub worked closely with the police, civil society groups, and 
social media providers in order to enhance their effectiveness in investigating and addressing 
complaints.56 The Hub’s experiences have recently inspired the UK government to establish its 
own online hate crime hub at the national level, run by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and 
Local Government.57 The Hub’s experiences have also been shared more broadly at the recent 
Online Hate Crime Summit.58 
The second issue that Mayor Khan has highlighted has been the need for increased 
reporting of hate speech and support for victims.59 While noting the racial insults directed at him 
as a youth, Mayor Khan stressed that offensive playground name-calling should also be eradicated, 
as it can lead to greater race hate.60 The Mayor’s policing policy has included a number of 
measures to increase hate crime reporting, including the launching of a smart phone hate crime 
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Standard (4 August 2017) <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/the-evening-standard-takes-a-look-
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reporting app.61 He has also piloted a programme establishing Hate Crime Victim Advocates to 
help victims to recover and cope with their experiences.62 These efforts have focused on ‘hate 
crimes’, which is a category that is of course broader than ‘hate speech’.63 However, in practice 
there appears to be considerable overlap in the concepts, as relatively few of the offences 
categorised as hate crimes by this programme have involved physical injury or property damage.64 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Mayor Khan’s efforts to address hate speech and hate crime have 
been subjected to vociferous criticism from the far right.65 According to two UK Independence 
Party (UKIP) representatives in the London Assembly, there is a ‘danger to freedom of speech 
which comes with the growing obsession with hate crime’.66 Khan has also been singled out for 
online criticism by self-proclaimed ‘free speech’ activists from the US far right, perhaps taking 
their cue from President Trump’s criticisms of the mayor.67  
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IV. Local Hate Speech Policies in East Asia 
While hate speech laws are sometimes seen as underdeveloped at the national level in East 
Asia, in fact many countries in the region have legal provisions which could potentially be used to 
regulate hate speech.68 Korea and Japan, however, have been reluctant to criminalise hate speech 
at the national level. Both countries are parties to the International Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, although Japan in 1995 filed a reservation to article 4 (which 
requires the criminalisation of hate speech) asserting the primacy of Japanese Constitutional law.69  
While both states have strong protections of free speech in their constitution, the Korean 
constitution states specifically that ‘[n]either speech nor the press shall violate the honour or rights 
of other persons nor undermine public morals or social ethics’.70  In recent years, however, the 
issue of hate speech has become more widely discussed in both countries, with potential responses 
discussed as a matter of both national and local policies. The following section examines four 
responses at the local level. 
1. Osaka 
 In Japan, hate speech first emerged as a potent political issue in Osaka, the country’s second 
largest city, which is known for its large populations of ethnic Koreans, Burakumin and Okinawans, 
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three groups that have sometimes faced discrimination in mainland Japan. 71  Anti-Korean 
demonstrations became especially prominent with the rise of the Zaitokukai, a right-wing 
nationalist group which was founded in 2007 and has since 2010 organised increasingly 
provocative public demonstrations in opposition to the ethnic Korean community.72  
 In the aftermath of a particularly virulent set of anti-Korean demonstrations in 2013, the 
question of how to effectively combat hate speech started to be debated in the local political arena, 
eventually leading to the Osaka City Council’s enactment of an anti-hate speech ordinance on 
January 15th, 2016.73 Pursuant to this ordinance, the city established a hate speech examination 
committee of scholars and lawyers to examine local hate speech complaints. If a particular incident 
was determined to constitute hate speech, then the identity of the perpetrator and a description of 
the incident would be posted on the City’s web page, in an attempt to name and shame.74 While 
this ordinance received considerable public attention, its implementation has been partially 
stymied by the city’s fear that publicising the names of those responsible for hateful online videos 
would violate national privacy of communication laws. Instead, City authorities have simply 
revealed the offending account usernames.75 
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 Interestingly, the passage of this ordinance has also been significant at the national level. 
It prompted debate within the Diet on the issue of hate speech, leading soon after to the enactment 
of Japan’s first law on hate speech, which entered into force in May 2016.76 In this respect, 
decentralised policymaking can be seen as fulfilling its oft-stated role as a ‘laboratory for 
democracy’ in the words of US Justice Louis Brandeis.77 Many other municipalities throughout 
Japan also publicly pressed the national government to ban hate speech in the two years leading 
up to the passage of the national law.78 In the end, however, the national anti-hate speech bill did 
not itself prohibit or punish hate speech, but rather called on local authorities to carry out 
educational anti-hate speech programmes, and has accordingly been criticised as weak.79 As in 
other countries, hate speech activists have also met with opposition on grounds of free speech, 
along with some a reluctance by some in Japan to acknowledge the extent of the problem.80 
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In the wake of the passage of Osaka’s local ordinance, contagion effects were notable not 
only at the national level, but also in other Japanese cities and provinces. In March 2018, Kyoto 
City began implementing guidelines to deter hate speech in public facilities, while Kobe and 
Nagoya debated passage of their own hate speech laws.81 Kyoto and Aichi Prefecture are also 
considering similar guidelines.82 Most importantly, Tokyo’s city government has recently taken 
action with passage of a new hate speech law based on the Osaka template.83 
 The city of Kawasaki, however, has been particularly active in developing hate speech 
policies, in part perhaps due to the high concentration of Koreans living in that city, and the need 
to protect them from abusive rhetoric.84 In March 2016, for example, three Kawasaki residents of 
Korean descent shed light on racist abuse in the area by publicly seeking assistance and relief from 
their local Legal Affairs Bureau in response to hate speech which they claimed violated their 
human rights.85  
Upon the passage of the national hate speech bill on 24 May 2016, Kawasaki almost 
immediately became the site of right-wing protests against the new law, and against the local 
Korean community. On 30 May, the first such protest was denied a permit to use two public parks 
by the local authorities, who cited the new national anti-hate speech law as supporting their 
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decision.86  This was followed by a preliminary injunction of the Yokohama District Court’s 
Kawasaki Branch on 2 June, prohibiting the right wing group from protesting within 500 metres 
of a local Korean Residents’ Association.87 The decision also noted the high probability that the 
event would violate hate speech standards recently developed at the national level.88 On 5 June, 
the protest eventually was set to take place in an area not covered by the city or court’s decisions, 
however it was called off at the last minute due to violence between demonstrators and counter-
protestors.89 
In November 2017, the City passed its own ordinance containing a set of official guidelines 
limiting the use of public facilities by persons or groups suspected of spreading hate speech.90 This 
legislative initiative came at the behest of then-Mayor Norihiko Fukuda, who had promised to 
enact such an ordinance in his mayoral re-election campaign.91 However, it was also the result of 
civil society pressure, and in particular the work of the Kawasaki Network of Citizens Against 
Hate Speech, a network of 156 human rights groups that has protested against hate speech since 
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2016.92 According to the Kawasaki guideline, city officials will determine the probability of hate 
speech being spread based on online postings, past activities and a background check. 93  If 
necessary, they will then lay out limitations that vary from warning to conditional permission to 
outright rejection (as was deemed appropriate in the city’s first use of the law with respect to a 
proposed rally in a public park).94  
The challenge in Kawasaki, as elsewhere in Japan, has been to ensure that their local 
ordinances are consistent with the freedom of speech guaranteed in article 21 of Japan’s 
constitution95 and the statutory duty not to deny the use of public authorities based on the content 
of an applicant’s speech.96 The Kawasaki guidelines attempted to deal with this issue by providing 
procedural protections to those suspected of hate speech and basing its definition of hate speech 
on that contained in the national Hate Speech Elimination Act.97 Thus, the legislative approach 
towards hate speech that had been started at the local level (in Osaka) had influenced national 
legislation, which in turn directly influenced policies elsewhere at the municipal level, showing 
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how rapidly policy transfers can occur between administrative levels when issues such as hate 
speech attain a certain degree of political salience. Constitutional doubts remain, however, and to 
date the Kawasaki guidelines have not been formally used to reject an application to use public 
facilities.98 On the other hand, City officials have successfully persuaded far right protesters to 
voluntarily cancel their rallies on several occasions, arguably showing the extra-legal impact of 
the new anti-hate speech norm. 
3. Seoul 
 The issue of whether and how to regulate hate speech has also arisen in Korea in recent 
years. Hate speech discourse in Korea has to a certain extent addressed the protection of ethnic 
minorities, but this has not always been the focal point for public discussion. Rather, Korean anti-
hate speech discussions have recently centred on hateful rhetoric against women, the LGBT 
community, and people from a particular region of Korea (such as Jeolla province), as well as the 
use of hate speech in the political arena, for example against the perceived politicisation of Sewol 
ferry disaster protesters.99 To date, there have been no hate speech laws passed on the national 
level, although the National Human Rights Commission of Korea has investigated hate speech.100 
As is the case in other countries, there is an active debate over the consistency of hate speech laws 
and freedom of speech. Free speech is a right that is perhaps valued more in Korea because it is 
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less secure. Korean progressives, for example, have long faced potential prosecution for speaking 
views seen as favourable to the North Korean regime.101  
As Korea’s largest city, with a high number of foreign and minority residents, one might 
expect Seoul to be at the forefront of local efforts to address hate speech, especially during the 
tenure of current mayor Park Won Soon, who is a former human rights lawyer and campaigned on 
an explicitly pro-human rights platform.102 In fact, there has been relatively little municipal action 
in the area. Early in Mayor Park’s time in office, he attempted to pass a human rights charter, 
which would have broadly condemned discrimination without specifically addressing hate speech. 
However, the proposed charter was the subject of vigorous protests by conservative Christian 
groups, who were concerned that condemning sexual orientation-based discrimination would help 
legitimise homosexuality.103 Mayor Park reacted by withdrawing the proposed charter, an outcome 
that was in turn protested by human rights activists.  
In the wake of this debacle, Mayor Park has been reluctant to introduce new normative 
human rights documents. However, he has established the Seoul Human Rights Centre to develop 
and implement human rights policies within the city,104  along with the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson Office to investigate complaints of human rights violations by the Seoul City 
government, and certain affiliated institutions.105 Until recently, the city’s human rights policy did 
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not focus on hate speech, but that appears to have recently changed; the city’s 2018-22 human 
rights plan notes that hate speech against women and social minorities represents one of the most 
serious human rights issues in the city, and recommends that it be addressed by a city as a 
priority.106 It also calls for the adoption of speech guidelines for Seoul City employees that are 
based in part on recommendations from the National Human Rights Commission of Korea’s report 
on hate speech.107 
Although Seoul does not have any general human rights or hate speech ordinances, it has 
since 2012 had an ordinance in place to specifically address the rights of students, called the Seoul 
Student Human Rights Ordinance. While the ordinance does not impose legally binding rules, it 
is used to influence policies adopted by local schools. In September 2017, the Seoul Metropolitan 
Council passed amendments to the Seoul Student Rights Ordinance to discourage the use of hate 
speech in city schools.108 This amendment came in the wake of outcry regarding an incident of a 
teacher calling an ethnically Chinese student ‘China’ instead of his name, along with statistics 
showing the growth in student complaints related to abusive speech.109  Despite its relatively 
narrow scope of application, the bill received considerable support from a broad network of civil 
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society groups who have stated that they view it as a first step towards anti-hate speech laws that 
can apply at the national level and beyond the educational sector in Seoul.110 
4. Bucheon 
Although several Korean local governments outside of Seoul have passed human rights 
charters or ordinances, so far these documents have not focused on hate speech.111 The most 
prominent efforts to pass an anti-hate speech law recently occurred in Bucheon, a city of 848,000 
between Seoul and Incheon. Bucheon has a relatively high migrant population, and saw hate 
speech enter the public discourse in the wake of the 2016 distribution of Islamophobic leaflets in 
local apartment complexes.112 In early 2017, Solidarity for Asian Human Rights and Culture, a 
local City Council member, the Bucheon Multicultural Network, and the Dongcheon Foundation 
(the pro bono wing of a major Seoul law firm) formed an executive committee to enact an anti-
hate speech ordinance.113 The initial awareness and interest in local anti-hate speech legislation 
was heavily influenced by Bucheon’s sister-city relationship with Kawasaki, which (as described 
above) had been a centre for hate speech policy debates in Japan.114 Yamada Takao, who was the 
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director of the Kawasaki Citizens’ Network against Hate Speech, made several visits to Bucheon 
to discuss the issue,115 including an appearance with other experts at an August 2017 forum on 
different strategies to deal with hate speech.116  
By November 2017, this process led to the drafting of an anti-hate speech ordinance, which 
would have required the City to take measures to prevent hate speech, provide support to victims, 
and require the deletion of online hate speech.117 At the time, however, the draft bill received 
lukewarm support and was not formally introduced to the City Council.118 As with the earlier 
attempts to pass a human rights ordinance in Seoul, opposition was spearheaded by right-wing 
Christian groups, who vigorously criticised the law as being pro-Islamic and inappropriate for the 
Korean social context.119 The bill’s backers intend to introduce a revised version of the ordinance 
for City Council consideration in 2019.120 
V. Comparison of European and East Asian Approaches 
 While the small sample of cities studied in this paper limits the generalities that can be 
drawn from any comparison, this study does nevertheless suggest certain interesting similarities 
and differences in local hate-speech policy making in Europe and East Asia.  
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 One common theme that emerges quite clearly is that local hate speech policies do not tend 
to emerge purely at the local level as indigenous responses to local problems, without broader 
relevance. Rather, in both Asia and Europe, transnational and translocal networks have been quite 
influential in the development of local hate speech policies.121 In Europe, these networks have 
perhaps been more formal, such as the European Coalition of Cities Against Racism, which 
prompted Graz to develop anti-hate speech norms in its accession document, as well as the Council 
of Europe and UCLG, which have helped other cities learn from and emulate Barcelona’s anti-
rumour network. In East Asia, transnational networking has been less formal but still influential, 
as for example through the influence of the sister city relationship with Kawasaki on the 
development of interest in a local hate speech policy in Bucheon.  
To locate this dynamic in the voluminous political science literature on policy transfer, 
these civil society networks can be characterised as non-state ‘transfer agents’, active in the 
‘horizontal’ transfer of hate speech policy between municipal jurisdictions.122 While the research 
in this area has tended to focus on policy transfer between states, an increasing number of studies 
also have highlighted the presence of policy transfer, learning and convergence between local 
authorities.123 The intra-regional nature of these transfers in the hate speech context is consistent 
with the general evidence that ‘shared social and economic characteristics, similarities in 
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institutional arrangements and strong cultural ties’ help facilitate policy transfer and 
convergence.124  
In both regions, there has also been significant ‘vertical’ policy transfer between the local 
and national level. This was most clear in Japan, where hate speech laws emerged first in Osaka, 
then influencing the national debate and national law-making, which in turn influenced policies in 
Kawasaki and elsewhere. However, one also saw the national government in the UK establish an 
online hate speech hub based on (and cooperating with) the London template, while in Korea the 
current Seoul city human rights plan relies on hate speech guidance developed by the National 
Human Rights Commission of Korea at the national level. In these cases, the policy transference 
seem largely to be cases of ‘emulation’ in Bennett’s four part typology of mechanisms of 
convergence, as opposed to the ‘elite networking’ at work in horizontal policy transfers.125 
At a more substantive level, it is also notable that in both the East Asian and European 
examples studied, municipalities have not engaged in criminalisation of hate speech. Rather, they 
have passed ordinances with civil law remedies or have engaged in promotional or priority-setting 
activities that do not require new legislation. This stands in contrast to the national level, where 
criminalisation of hate speech (or the lack of it) dominates the policy discourse, even while other 
policy options do exist. In some countries, the lack of local criminalisation undoubtedly stems 
from the fact that local governments would normally lack power to pass criminal ordinances. But 
this is not always a restriction: in Japan, for example, local authorities are permitted to impose 
                                                          
124 Ibid 
125 Colin Bennett, ‘What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?’ (1991) 21 British Journal of Political 
Science 215. In addition to emulation and elite networking, Bennett also identifies harmonisation through 
international regimes and penetration by external actors as potential mechanisms of policy convergence 
Ibid. However, these mechanisms seem less prominent in the hate speech context.  
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penalties of up to two years imprisonment and fines of up to 1 million yen in response to breaches 
of their ordinances. 126  In the UK, local government byelaws may create criminal offences 
punishable in magistrates’ court, although they must be approved by the central government before 
they can come into force and cannot be used where an issue is already regulated by national-level 
legislation. 127  Nevertheless, whether for political or legal reasons (relating to potential 
constitutional conflicts in Japan and potential national-level pre-emption in the UK), the Japanese 
cities studied and London local authorities have refrained from passing hate speech ordinances or 
byelaws that include criminal penalties.  
The preceding analysis also reveals certain differences between local hate speech policy-
making in Europe and East Asia. Perhaps the most evident of these is in the basic objective of local 
policies. In European countries, there is already regulation of hate speech at the national level 
(generally some form of criminalisation), and often a high degree of social consensus on the 
normative desirability of anti-hate speech policy. Thus, the focus of local governments seems to 
be more centred on specific aspects or contexts of hate speech, such as the use of hate speech 
online or in social media (as in Barcelona and London) or in political campaigns (as in Graz). They 
also seem to engage more in improving monitoring and enforcement anti-hate speech policies, 
rather than developing or promoting new norms. Meanwhile, in Japan and Korea, which (until 
recently) lacked general hate speech regulation at the national level, local policy-makers have 
focused more on asserting the general principle that hate speech merits official condemnation and 
                                                          
126 Local Autonomy Act (Japan) (n 96) art 14-3. 
127  Local Government Act (UK) 1972 s 235. See also, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, ‘Local 
Authority Byelaws in England: A Discussion Paper’ (April 2006) 9 (‘byelaws create criminal offences’). 
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suppression, without concentrating on particular sub-issues (with the exception of the Seoul City 
Council’s amendment that specifically condemned hate speech in schools). 
Another difference is in the role of civil society networks in developing hate speech policy. 
In the East Asian examples studied, civil society groups have played important roles in pressing 
for local hate speech regulation (notable examples being the Kawasaki Network of Citizens against 
Hate Speech and the ad hoc group that lobbied for a Bucheon hate speech ordinance). European 
regulatory choices, on the other hand, seem to be more top-down products of progressive mayors 
or local governments, perhaps prompted in the Graz and Barcelona case by a desire to 
operationalise their commitment to being a ‘Human Rights City’. In Europe, civil society groups 
have been primarily influential as implementation partners, the most notable examples being ETC 
Graz and the civil society groups that work with local government personnel in London’s online 
hate crime hub. In Barcelona, too, the anti-rumours policy has been implemented largely outside 
the public sector, through the work of citizens who volunteer as ‘anti-rumour agents’. 
The paper also suggests a differing level of intensity in the opposition to local hate speech 
policy-making in Europe and East Asia.. Perhaps because Japan and Korea have not yet developed 
strong national anti-hate speech norms, local policy-making in these countries has been quite 
fiercely contested, including through public demonstrations in Kawasaki and Bucheon. In Korea, 
the Bucheon City Council in fact proved unable to pass an anti-hate speech law due to the intensity 
of public opposition, as was also the case with the Seoul mayor’s earlier attempt to pass a human 
rights ordinance. In Europe, on the other hand, local hate speech policies have been opposed by 
somewhat marginal political forces, such as the representatives of UKIP in London, but have not 




 As cities around the world become more and more diverse, maintaining social comity in 
the public sphere has inevitably become an important challenge. It is thus unsurprising that local 
governments in both Europe and East Asia have in recent years attempted to develop policies to 
combat hate speech. As this study shows, such policies can take on a number of different forms. 
Some cities have used their law-making powers to pass ordinances providing for civil penalties for 
political hate speech, naming and shaming offenders, or limiting access to public spaces for those 
engaging in hate speech. Other cities have used their existing programmatic authority to develop 
policies to monitor hate speech, assist in reporting it to relevant authorities, or to assist its victims.   
To date, these local policies have received relatively little attention. This begins to fill this 
gap through a comparative analysis, and can be seen as a starting point for further examination of 
these important new issues. Potential further questions could include (for example) the following. 
Why do some local governments adopt hate speech policies while others do not? Why do different 
cities adopt different kinds of hate speech policies? How effective are local hate speech policies? 
How have local governments addressed the tension between hate speech policy and freedom of 
expression? This paper can also serve as a resource for local policy-makers and activists interested 
in the policy options for addressing hate speech at the local level, and the challenges that such 
policies may face. 
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